In July 2026, a report released by shipping analytics firm Sea-Intelligence revealed a structural fact: during the first half of this year, on the four major east‑west container trade lanes, the share of scheduled capacity proactively cancelled by liner companies ranged from 10% to 14%, compared with just 6% to 8% in the same period of 2019. This near‑doubling of the blank‑sailing baseline did not occur during a demand‑collapse crisis, but against a backdrop of moderate global container demand growth and a heavy influx of new vessel deliveries. Blank sailings—once an emergency measure reserved for extreme scenarios such as the financial crisis or the pandemic—have now evolved into a routine tool of daily capacity management for liner operators. The profound consequence of this shift is that the "easy‑to‑rise, hard‑to‑fall" dynamic of freight rates is transitioning from a cyclical phenomenon to a structurally entrenched norm.

I. Data Perspective: Blank Sailings Have Divorced from the Traditional Logic of "Only When Demand Is Weak"

The Sea‑Intelligence report provided a breakdown of cancelled sailings by route: in the first half of 2026, the Asia‑North America East Coast route recorded the highest cancellation rate at 14%; Asia‑North America West Coast and Asia‑Northern Europe both stood at 11%; and Asia‑Mediterranean at 10%. All were significantly higher than the single‑digit levels in the same period of 2019.

Even more noteworthy is the asymmetry: there is a marked divergence between the growth in total planned capacity and the growth in cancelled capacity. For example, on the Asia‑North America East Coast route, planned capacity grew by 46% between 2019 and the first half of 2026, reaching over 6.09 million TEU; however, over the same period, cancelled capacity surged from 273,700 TEU to 863,400 TEU, more than tripling. On the Asia‑Mediterranean route, planned capacity rose by 56% while cancelled capacity jumped by 159%; on Asia‑Northern Europe, capacity grew by 20% while cancellations increased by 83%; and on Asia‑North America West Coast, capacity expanded by 16% while cancellations soared by 62%.

This means that the capacity dividend from the batch delivery of newbuildings has not been passed on to cargo owners. Sea‑Intelligence explicitly noted that the additional capacity has been "absorbed" by carriers through a higher proportion of strategic blank sailings, thereby controlling effective supply. Unlike the large‑scale passive cancellations during the pandemic, which were a response to a sudden demand plunge, today’s blank sailings are more stable and regular, maintaining a tight market balance while improving the predictability of capacity management. In the agency's words, "the pre‑2020 expectation of very few, single‑digit blank sailings is structurally outdated."

II. Two‑Way Asymmetry: How Normalized Blank Sailings Cement the "Easy‑to‑Rise, Hard‑to‑Fall" Pattern

The impact of normalized blank sailings on the freight‑rate mechanism is asymmetrical in both directions, and this is precisely the core mechanism that solidifies the "easy‑to‑rise, hard‑to‑fall" structure.

In an upward cycle: the capacity buffer has been pre‑emptively removed. When demand surges due to peak seasons, geopolitical rerouting, or restocking pulses, the market would normally have a pool of "idle capacity" that can be quickly redeployed. But normalized blank sailings mean that this capacity has already been locked into non‑operational status. The "reservoir" of effective capacity has been artificially drained, the elasticity of the supply‑demand gap tightens sharply, and freight rates jump quickly under demand impulses.

This effect was fully validated in the July 2026 market. According to Drewry data, at the beginning of July, the World Container Index (WCI) surged 9% in a single week to US$4,530 per 40‑foot container, and rose another 2% the following week to US$4,639, hitting its highest level since September 2024. Rates from Shanghai to New York reached US$7,904 per FEU, Shanghai‑Los Angeles US$6,482, Shanghai‑Rotterdam US$4,933, and Shanghai‑Genoa US$6,463. Year‑on‑year, rates were up more than 75%, even as effective capacity had largely recovered—capacity was back, but prices did not return.

In a downward cycle: blank sailings act as a "brake pad" on rates. When demand weakens and rates come under pressure, carriers' first reaction is not to cut prices competitively, but to increase blank sailings to tighten supply. Drewry's tracking shows that in June 2026, the number of blank sailings on major east‑west routes stood at 54; that narrowed to 42 in July, and is expected to fall further to 36 in August. Even as the share of blank sailings dropped back to around 5% from late July to late August, rates remained more than 70% higher than a year earlier, and the high‑rate base has not fundamentally shifted.

The rate chart that cargo owners see is not a smooth downward curve, but a step‑wise pattern of "drop‑then‑consolidate‑then‑drop again," with the overall decline stretched out significantly. No buffer on the way up, but a brake on the way down—this two‑way asymmetry is precisely the key to the evolution of "easy to rise, hard to fall" from a cyclical phenomenon into a structural norm.

III. Intra‑Alliance Divergence: Uneven Enforcement of Capacity Discipline

The implementation of normalized blank sailings is not monolithic, with significant divergence across alliances. According to data released by Linerlytica in May 2026, the cancellation rates among the four alliance blocs varied widely: the Gemini Cooperation (Maersk and Hapag‑Lloyd) recorded the lowest at just 2.8%; MSC stood at 15.9%; the Premier Alliance at 17.1%; and the Ocean Alliance the highest at 19.9%.

This divergence reflects different capacity‑management philosophies. Gemini relies on a high‑reliability "hub‑and‑spoke" network model, trading a low cancellation rate for a service‑reliability premium. In contrast, the other alliances lean more heavily on frequent blank sailings to proactively manage effective supply. Notably, even Gemini—the lowest cancellator—amended its cooperation agreement after facing profit pressure in the first quarter of 2026, expanding its authorised blank‑sailing window from the previous Chinese New Year and National Day holidays to include Christmas, New Year, and similar holidays, while shortening the notice period from 12 weeks to 6–8 weeks. This shows that, when confronted with market pressure, even the "low‑cancellation" camp is moving toward greater capacity‑management flexibility.

The alliance framework provides three layers of support for blank sailings: scale effects allow members to cross‑cancel different vessels on the same route, maintaining service coverage while reducing total capacity; information sharing enables members to better judge when and how much to cancel; and discipline constraints reduce the prisoner's‑dilemma risk of any single carrier quietly reinstating sailings to grab market share. As a result, blank sailings have been upgraded from "case‑by‑case decisions" to "systemic behaviour."

IV. Cost Accumulation and Regulatory Gaps: The Supporting Base for High Freight Rates

The firmness of freight rates in 2026 is not driven by blank sailings alone. The geopolitical aftershocks persist: heightened tensions with Iran in the first half of the year briefly disrupted the Strait of Hormuz; although navigation was restored via a temporary US‑Iran agreement, security risks remain. Red Sea diversions continue to absorb effective capacity. The quarterly Bunker Adjustment Factor (BAF) reset in July saw some carriers impose hikes of up to 80%. CMA CGM announced an increase in its Asia‑Northern Europe FAK rates to US$7,000 per FEU effective 15 July, and Asia‑Mediterranean to US$7,900–8,500; HMM concurrently imposed a US$3,000 peak‑season surcharge. Capacity is back, but the cost‑structure base has not returned.

On the regulatory front, effective constraints have also been absent. After the EU terminated the Consortia Block Exemption Regulation (CBER) in 2024, alliance vessel‑sharing and slot‑swap arrangements still fall under independent commercial cooperation frameworks outside CBER's jurisdiction. The US Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA 2022) grants the FMC greater investigative authority, but the threshold for proving that blank sailings constitute "unjust discrimination" remains extremely high. Regulation is "present but not assertive," leaving operational room for normalized blank sailings.

V. Cascading Impacts on Heavy‑Lift and Project Cargo Owners

Normalized blank sailings have particularly far‑reaching consequences for project cargo, complete plant equipment, and engineering materials. The core constraint for heavy‑lift shipments is "schedule certainty"—installation timelines for complete plants and construction schedules are often planned to the week, and a single sailing cancellation can trigger a chain of delays across the entire project. Global schedule reliability in 2026 has hovered between only 42% and 48%, meaning that on many routes, delays are more likely than on‑time arrivals. Rolled cargo typically adds an extra 7 to 14 days or even longer to delivery lead times.

Availability of slots declines. Blank sailings directly reduce the number of available sailings. Heavy‑lift cargo, constrained by volume and weight, is inherently difficult to switch to alternative voyages, and cancellations further narrow the already limited window of compatible schedules.

Risk of port omissions rises. After blank sailings, alliances often "merge" services to maintain coverage, and the merged routes may skip certain ports of call. Secondary ports frequently used for heavy‑lift shipments face an increased likelihood of being bypassed, forcing cargo owners to accept transshipment arrangements.

Bargaining power weakens. When effective capacity is continuously managed, cargo owners' leverage in rate negotiations is structurally undermined, especially during upward cycles. Carriers' confidence in "cancelling to defend rates" significantly shrinks the room for negotiation.

The core strategy to cope with this landscape involves: securing medium‑ to long‑term slot contracts in advance to reduce reliance on the spot market; establishing multi‑route, multi‑port alternatives; incorporating alliance capacity‑adjustment announcements into project logistics scheduling variables; and systematically reviewing surcharge reasonableness to negotiate room during downward cycles.

Conclusion

The data from the first half of 2026 delivers a clear conclusion: blank sailings have evolved from an emergency tool into a routine strategy, and "easy to rise, hard to fall" is no longer a natural by‑product of supply‑demand bargaining, but a structural feature cemented by institutionalised capacity management. Newbuilding deliveries have not diluted carriers' pricing power; instead, they have provided even greater operational scope for blank sailings. As long as the alliance framework remains stable and the regulatory environment does not tighten fundamentally, this pattern will continue to dominate the rhythm of freight‑rate movements. For cargo owners, rather than hoping for a return to "free‑floating" rates, it is more realistic to acknowledge this new normal at the cognitive level and to build sufficient buffers and flexibility into procurement strategies accordingly.